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INTRODUCTION

The Dissonance Theory was first put forth by Leon Festinger
(1957).

In his original work, Festinger theorized that "if two

cognitive elements are relevant, the relation between them is either
dissonant or consonant.

The magnitude of the dissonance increases as

the importance or value of the elements increases."

According to

Festinger's supposition, a person will experience dissonance if he
perceives a contradiction or incongruity to exist between relevant,
cognitive elements.

Festinger explains further that this resulting

dissonance "acts in the same way as a state of drive or need or tension" (Festinger, 1957, pp. 16, 18).
Using Festinger's description of dissonance as a state of drive or
tension, Cronkhite (1966) posed two hypotheses relating to dissonance:
1)

When an individual perceives two or more cognitions to be
"dissonant," he experiences a state of drive or arousal;
and

2)

The individual experiencing the state of drive or arousal
will behave in such a way designed to reduce the drive.

In his studies, Cronkhite defined the degree of dissonance as the
magnitude of the difference between a subject's attitude toward the
concept and his attitude toward the source.

Therefore, the greater

the difference between attitude toward source and attitude toward the
concept, the greater the intensity of dissonance.

Cronkhite believed

the state of arousal relating to dissonance was a physical phenomena.
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Arousal, as defined by Berlyne (1960), is "a unitary emotional response
dimension ranging from sleep to frantic excitement."
Using both Festinger and Cronkhite's definitions, it would appear
that dissonance is an emotional state involving cognitive elements .
Chapanis and Chapanis (1964) furthered the idea that dissonance is an
emotion with their definition:
The basic premise is that discrepant cognitions create
tension which the individual strives to reduce by making
his cognitions more consistent. This tension is called
cognitive dissonance •••
Tension is also defined as an emotional state by Mehrabian and Russell
( 1977).
Two years after Cronkhite presented his operational definition of
dissonance, Aronson (1968) hypothesized that dissonance is a "significant motivational force only when the self-concept or some other firmly
held expectancy was involved."

In his definition, Aronson uses two

terms, which lead the reader to believe dissonance is an emotion:
"motivational force" and "expectancy."
Malkis (1982) defined dissonance as a state of tension or
disequilibrium caused by a logical or connotative inconsistency among
cognitions.

Because tension is considered an emotional response

(Mehrabian and Russell,

1977), Malkis' further portrays dissonance as

an emotion.
Despite these and numerous other attempts to explain dissonance,
few authors have provided operational definitions allowing for the
actual measurement of dissonance.

Biggers and Christ (1983) recognized

this problem and formulated an operational definition using three
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dimensions of emotional response: pleasure-displeasure, arousal-sleep,
and dominance-submissiveness.

Conceiving of dissonance as an emotional

state resulting from inconsistent psychological elements, they define
dissonance as "an emotional state composed of low pleasure, high
arousal, and at least moderately high dominance ...
~his

concept opens new avenues by which proven tools for gauging

emotions can be applied to the neglected problem of measuring dissonance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the emotional

component of dissonance and to present a viable instrument for its
measurement.

Background Research
From the first dissonance research to the present investigators
have failed to measure dissonance itself.

Festinger and Carlsmith

(1959) conducted an experiment in which subjects completed a boring
task and then were asked to tell other subjects (actually confederates6
that the task had been interesting.

Some subjects were paid $1.00

to participate in counter-attitudinal advocacy (CAA) while others
received $20.

Festinger and Carlsmith found subjects who were paid $1

believed the task was significantly more enjoyable than those in both
the control group and the $20 condition.
The authors explained that subjects receiving only $1 for their
CAA did not feel the payment was enough justification for the action;
so in order to regain consonance, they changed attitudes to fit the
role play of praise for the task.

Thus, Festinger's theory becomes a

theory of "insufficient justification."
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Dissonance studies have varied justification in many ways.
(1973) found that most studies manipulated material reward.

Miller

At the

writing of his article, at least 24 studies had used cash or something
with cash value;

10 studies utilized audience approval or disapproval;

justification was linked to the attractiveness of the sponsor in six
studies; and four or more studies varied the numbers of reasons for
participating in CAA.
Justification is difficult to manipulate.

Berger (1969) paid sub-

jects $2.50 or $.50, and asked them to rate the adequacy of this reward
on a four-point scale.

The high justification subjects ranked $2.50

as maximally adequate with a 4.0 on a four-point scale, and yet those
who received $.50 did not rate their reward below a 3.0.

These find-

ings illustrate the difficulty faced when attempting to achieve a
perception of low justification.

Bachman, Bukowski, Forkner and Peretz

(1969) believed subjects who received $.50, yet knew others were
receiving $2.50, would be disgruntled.
assumption.

Results did not support this

In fact, they found $.50 was conceived to be adequate.

Some studies have not manipulated the reward form of justification
in order to produce dissonance (Goethals, Cooper & Naficy,

1979; Hig-

gins, Rhodewalt & Zanna, 1979); though, these studies did try to ensure
that subjects were aware of the freedom to choose participation.
Cooper and Worchel (1970) manipulated justification and consequence,
concluding that both are necessary elements of dissonance.

Goethals,

Cooper and Naficy (1979) manipulated three levels of consequence
while Higgins et al. (1979) varied arousal and pleasure as types of
consequences.

Both studies achieved results attributed to dissonance
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without manipulating reward.

Other authors have not given a reward

for participation in CAA (i.e., money or extra credit), and yet
achieved dissonance effects (Bazerman, Guiliano & Appelman, 1984;
Beauvais & Joule, 1982; Goethals et al., 1979; Higgins et al., 1979;
Rholes, Baily & McMillan,

1982; Steele & Liu, 1981).

These studies

lead the reader to believe consequence as well as reward and freedom
to choose can be considered a form of justification since it produces
dissonance effects singly.
Public commitment enhances the perception of negative consequences
resulting in dissonance.

Carlsmith, Collins and Helmreich (1966)

demonstrated that subjects who role played to a confederate had greater
attitude change with less justification than students who wrote CAA
essays receiving the greater reward.

They concluded that for disso-

nance results, CAA must be public.
However, studies have effectively used essays instead of public
commitment to achieve dissonance.

The key is that a person must fore-

see negative consequences resulting from their behavior whether public
or by essay.

Linder, Cooper and Jones (1967) found dissonance effects

by manipulating incentive and choice after asking subjects to write
an essay advocating a ban on Communist speakers at state-supported
institutions.

Other researchers have used CAA essays as a means of

producing dissonance when the subject perceives possible negative
consequences from their actions.
Zanna, Higgins & Taves,

(Higgins, Rhodewalt & Zanna, 1979;

1976).

As mentioned briefly before, a form of justification required
for dissonance is perception of choice.

In Festinger and Carlsmith
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(1959), subjects were given the option of refusing to role play.
Linder et al. (1967) manipulated choice as a variable affecting dissonance.

They discovered an inverse relationship between magnitude of

incentive and attitude change for subjects who were given the choice
of participating in role play and a positive relationship for those
who were not given any alternatives.
dissonance.

This result was credited to

Most subsequent studies have assumed that choice is an

inherent part of dissonance production.
As discussed earlier, despite advances made in the study of
conditions necessary to produce dissonance, few authors have defined
dissonance operationally.

This lack of definition has made it diffi-

cult for dissonance advocates to support its existence.

Festinger

(1957, p. 15) recognized this problem when he formulated the theory
originally:
The conceptual definitions of dissonance and consonance
present some serious difficulties. If the theory of dissonance is to have relevance for empirical data, one must be
able to identify dissonances and consonances unequivocally.
But it is clearly hopeless to attempt to obtain a complete
listing of cognitive elements, and even were such a listing
available, in some cases it would be difficult or impossible
to say, a priori, which of the three relationships holds.
Several researchers have sought to dispel this problem.

Cronkhite

(1966) perceived dissonance as a state of drive or arousal, a physiological state.

He measured the physiological state of his subjects

(i.e., heartbeat) before, during, and after they listened to a speech
contrary to their beliefs.

He did not find support for dissonance

using physical measurement of arousal.

Subjects in the high dissonance

condition demonstrated less physical arousal than those in the low
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dissonance cell.

(The arousal of dissonance should be questioned in

this study since there were no apparent negative consequences perceived
by the subjects.)

Surprisingly, participants who did experience a

high degree of arousal did not seek available means of dissonance
reduction.
Linder et al. (1967) used response latency to measure disson nee .
These authors offered subjects $.50 and $2.50 to participate in essay
writing.

After a few trial runs, the experimenter began to notice

subjects in the high-choice/low-incentive condition took longer
to decide whether to participate than those in the high-choice/highincentive category.

He began to time the decision process with a

hidden stop watch and, interestingly enough, discovered that subjects
in the high-choice/low-incentive group used considerably more time
in the decision-making process than those in the high-choice/highincenti ve condition.

The authors concluded that pre-decisional

conflict leads to post-decisional dissonance.

They also examined the

essays of the four groups for differences in length, persuasiveness,
argument, and organization of essays.

No significance resulted from

this effort to measure dissonance.
Carlsmith et al. (1966) did include a measurement of dissonance in
their study.

Confederates were asked to rate apparent conflict and

signs of discomfort in subjects.

Subjects in the low-incentive condi-

tion demonstrated the greatest conflict.
Although the aforementioned studies did provide a measure of
dissonance, they demonstrate little progress toward a standardized
measure of dissonance.

Without such a measure, the hypothesized
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relationships between dissonance and attitude change cannot be validated.

Miller (1973) claimed this oversight is one of the significant

problems prohibiting progress of dissonance research.

Despite Miller'

analysis, experimenters continue to conduct research explaining results
with dissonance theory.

Their persistence is difficult to understand

since the mechanism through which dissonance is created and reduced
has not been specified (Biggers & Christ, 1983).
Few researchers in recent years have sought to measure the state
of dissonance or even investigate elements of the state (i.e., pleasure
and dominance).

Higgins, Rhodewalt and Zanna (1979) noted three ways

of reducing dissonance:
misattribution.

attitude change, addition of a cognition, and

Therefore, a possible conclusion is that dissonance

may be present even though no attitude change results from CAA.

Storms

and Nisbett (1970) found that when subjects were given a pill (actually
a placebo) and told that it would cause side affects of arousal, they
had less attitude change; instead reducing dissonance with misattribution.

The authors concluded that arousal is part of dissonance and,

if subjects can blame arousal experienced on the drug, they will not
report as great a change in attitude.
Zanna and Cooper (1974) carried this research further by demonstrating that subjects who were given a relaxing pill experienced
more attitude change.

This was attributed to the possibility that

subjects could not blame their unpleasant state on the pill.

Other

researchers have emphasized that arousal is a necessary component of
dissonance (Kiesler & Pallack,

1976; Pittman, 1975).
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Zanna and Cooper (1976) discovered that subjects who ingested a
pill but were provided no information on side effects had no significant attitude change.

It must be noted that attitude change is not

the only indication of dissonance.

Zanna et al. (1976), by giving

their subjects a pill, may have also given them something to blame
their discomfort on (misattribution), even though the individuals were
not told what side effects to expect.
Higgins et al. (1979) decided to examine pleasure as a component
of dissonance rather than arousal.

They hypothesized that unpleas-

antness, and not arousal, is the motivating factor for dissonance
reduction (assuming dissonance exists).
They believed that inconsistencies produce an unpleasant arousal,
and purposed to study whether arousal is part of dissonance or a consequence of unpleasantness.

By manipulating choice and information about

the pills given (pleasant and unpleasant, arousing and non-arousing
side effects), Higgins et al. (1979) concluded that future research
should consider unpleasantness a component of dissonance; and, though
high arousal may be present in the beginning stages, it is not a factor
in reducing dissonance.
Though these people (Storm & Nisbett, 1970; Zanna & Cooper, 1974;
Pittman,
al.,

1975; Kiesler & Pallak,

1976; Zanna et al.,

1976; Higgins et

1979) are responsible for advances made in the study of dissonance

components, they failed to measure dissonance itself.

The results of

this research, however, are important cornerstones for the operational
definition of dissonance and subsequent tool for measurement discussed
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later.

If dissonance can be shown to exist, the many otherwise excel-

lent studies on the subject will gain credibility in the scientific
community.
Cognitive dissonance has practically become a household word.

The

dissonant state and its value as a persuasive property, continue to
fascinate researchers up to the present.

In recent years, disson nc

studies have examined management behavior relating to justification
of commitment to a course of action.

In one study of individual

responsibility Bazerman (1984) found in a simulated situation subjects
would escalate financial support of a failing business venture if told
they had been responsible for the initial investment decision and
subsequent support given to that business.

Groups and individuals not

responsible for the initial investment in the now failing business did
not increase financial backing.
dissonance.

These results were attributed to

However, dissonance was neither defined or measured.

Frey from Germany and Beauvois and Joule from France have also
conducted dissonance studies (Frey,

1982; Beauvois & Joule,

1982).

Their research demonstrates the far-reaching effects of dissonance
theory and the international interest it has received.

These research-

ers provided information about the avoidance of dissonant information,
and the effect of performance evaluation on subsequent attitudes toward
a boring task.

Both studies explained findings with the dissonance

theory, yet did not operationally define this emotional state.
These examples are given to illustrate the tautology present in
the over 900 articles and studies relating to dissonance.

A noticeable
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void exists where there should be operational definition and a means
for measuring this thought-provoking physiological and psychological
state.

Dissonance and Emotion
The many definitions discussed at the beginning of this paper
describe dissonance as an emotional state.

Dissonance researchers

have also investigated components of dissonance, such as arousal and
pleasure, indicating again that dissonance is an emotion (Cronkhite,
1966; Higgins et al.,

1979; Zanna & Cooper,

1976).

Biggers and Christ (1983) have suggested that since dissonance is
an emotion, it can be measured with an emotion scale.

They noted

that a growing body of literature exists suggesting emotional states
are interrelated and can be measured with a three-factor system:
pleasure-displeasure, degree of arousal, and dominance-submissiveness
(Mehrabian & Russell,

1974; Mehrabian, 1980).

There is indication

that a common core of emotional responses exists and stimulation of
one emotion influences perception in another mode (Mehrabian &
Russell, 1974).

Biggers and Christ cite many studies which demonstrat

the interrelationship between pleasure and arousal; and, some dissonance researchers have examined the relationship in detail (Zanna &
Cooper,

1976; Zanna et al.,

1976; Higgins et al., 1979).

Higgins et

al. (1979) summarized that unpleasantness is a component of dissonance
with arousal being present in the beginning stages of the emotion.
Russell (1980) asked subjects to group emotional terms such a s
frustrated, sleepy, and glad into related categories.

He found that
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these categories fit the three dimensions of pleasure, arousal, and
dominance with little overlap.

Russell and Mehrabian (1977) and

Russell (1979) demonstrated that subjects can accurately report their
own emotional state using the three factor solution.

These authors

claim the dimension of pleasure-displeasure is a feeling "that can be
assessed readily with semantic differential measures or with behavior 1
indicators such as smiles, laughter, and, iu general, positive versus
negative facial expressions.

Arousal can also be measured with the

semantic differential scale as "a unitary emotional response dimension
ranging from sleep to frantic excitement" (Berlyne, 1960).

Some non-

verbal measures of arousal are vocal activity, facial activity, speech
rate and speech volume.

Lastly, "dominance-submissiveness is a feeling

state that can be assessed from verbal reports using the semantic
differential method" and behavior such as relaxation (Mehrabian, 1970,

1972).

Dominance-submissiveness operates as permission to behave.

Biggers and Christ (1983) describe this emotional component as a range
"from extreme feelings of being influenced and controlled to feelings
of mastery and control."

A more detailed explanation of dominance

follows:
When a person feels dominant (s)he feels as if (s)he has
freedom to enact a full range of behavior. When pleasure
and arousal are high we expect strong approach behavior,
if one also feels dominant (s)he would approach more
than (s)he felt submissive.
(Biggers and Christ, 1983)
A list of bipolar adjectives was developed by Mehrabian and
Russell (1974) with which subjects can record their emotional responses
along the three dimensions of pleasure, arousal and dominance.

This
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instrument produced a reliability score above alpha .80 (Mehrabian &
Russell, 197 4).
Taking their research further, Russell and Mehrabian (1977)
listed 151 emotional states and defined them in reference to the three
emotional dimensions.
arousal and dominance.

For example, enjoyment is comprised of pleasure,
On this 18-bipolar adjective scale, guilt and

tension rate low in pleasure and dominance and high in arousal.

They

concluded that these dimensions are necessary for the defining of
emotional states, but they questioned if these factors are adequate
for all emotional states.
There are over 2,000 terms in English denoting various emotional
states (Wallace & Carson,

1973).

Some researchers place these in

independent categories claiming that all emotions are mutually exclusive, while others focus on the interrelationships of emotional
clusters.
uni-po~ar

McNair, Lou and Droppleman (1971) presented a list of six
emotional states: tension-anxiety, depression-dejection,

anger-hostility, vigor-activity, fatigue-inertia, and friendliness.
Russell and Steiger (1982) found that the three dimensions given
earlier (pleasure-displeasure, arousal-sleepiness, and dominancesubmissiveness) actually encompass the various emotional states more
comprehensively.
Russell and Steiger utilized the three dimensions in two ways:
measuring the emotional state of others and measuring one's own emotional state (Russell & Steiger, 1982).

They found the emotional

scale developed by Russell and Mehrabian (1974) satisfactory as a
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reliable instrument useful for reporting on the emotional state of
others as well describing the emotional state of self.
Russell and Mehrabian's (1978) results indicate that emot ons
influence the behavioral responses of individuals.

According to this

research, pleasure and arousal determine approach avoidance.

Disso-

nance has also been studied in relation to approach avoidance (Steele &
Liu,

19 81 ; Frey ,

19 8 2 ) •

Biggers and Pryor (1982) examined these two dimensions with
respect to attitude change.

When the environment elicited pleasurable

responses, the speech was more effective in producing a change in
attitude toward agreement with the speech.

However, an environment

which promoted low pleasure actually produced an opinion change in
the opposite direction of that advocated by the speaker.
Biggers and Christ (1983) argued that a person's emotional response is comprised of a common core of emotion or the three affect
dimensions: pleasure, arousal and dominance (Mehrabian & Russell,
1974; Russell & Mehrabian,

1977; Russell,

1980).

If this is the case,

changes in emotion should be measurable along the three dimensions.
This paper seeks to apply the three affect dimensions to the measurement of dissonance.
Various researchers interpret these three factors as being
affective rather than cognitive.

Biggers and Christ (1983) claim that

"the emotions elicited by a group of stimuli can be described as an
affective or feeling state that is the primary response of the organism
to the situation."

However, Lazarus (1982) writes that the emot'on

experience includes three components:

thoughts, action impulses and
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semantic disturbances.

He believed that the cognitive process is a

necessary part of emotion and refused to confirm that feelings come
first in the emotional process.

His definition of emotion was a trans-

action between organism and environment in which cognitive processes
are crucial."

Dissonance and Cognitions
Some authors consider cognitions the influential elements of
emotions.

Janis and Terwilliger (1962) asked subjects to read a fear

appeal message and then give all their thoughts and feelings about what
they had just read.

They were allowed to comment at any time during

the reading, but were asked to remark upon what they had read at the
end of each paragraph.

Janis and Terwlinger recorded the readings on

tape and then transcribed and categorized the comments made.

The

categories are as follows:
Affective Reactions:
1.
2.

Expressions of worry, disturbance, emotional
tension (i.e. , "That is awful!").
Reference to unpleasant aspects of cancer.

Evaluative Comments:
1.

2.
3.

4.

s.

complete rejection
Major criticism
Minor criticism - argument not clear
I agree.
Major favorable
Minor favorable - comments on style
Paraphrasing of arguments just read

The authors achieved .85 intercoder reliability on the independent
ratings of comments.
Brock (1967) developed a method for thought-listing when he s udied measurement of responses and not the end products of persuasion

16
such as attitude change, rejection and reduced credibility.

Brock gave

subjects 10 minutes to write everything they thought about during the
message presentation.

He developed a method for rating these ideas

and thoughts and discovered the degree to which a person is persuaded
is determined by that individual's thoughts.

He suggested research

continue seeking additional tools for measuring thoughts.
Cook (1969) also used the thought-listing process to examine
counter arguments produced by subjects during a persuasive message.
He achieved intercoder reliability of .95 and .94 for the agreement
measure.

Other researchers have consistently used thought-listing

as an effective tool for examining cognitions inhibiting persuasion
attempts (Insko, Turnbull & Yandell, 1974; Osterhouse & Brock,

1970;

Pallak, Mueller, Dollar & Pallak, 1972).
Petty, Wells and Brock (1976) used thought-listing in a study to
see if distraction affected yielding to propaganda.

They gave subjects

2 1/2 minutes to recall and list thoughts they had during the persuasive message.
reliability.

Judges categorizing the thoughts had .92 intercoder
Petty et al. (1976) discovered that cognitive responses

mediate interaction between persuasion and distraction.
After being told the topic of the persuasive message, Petty and
Cacioppo (1977) left subjects for five minutes.

Upon their re urn

subjects were given 2 1/2 minutes to list the thoughts they had while
waiting and were then asked to rate their own thoughts as agreeing or
disagreeing with the message.
100 percent.

Judges agreed with subjects' ra

·Petty and Cacioppo (1979) utilized thought-listing

ngs

17
again to examine effects of issue involvement on persuasion.

Once more

they achieved significant intercoder reliability.
The literature review has illustrated tremendous support for dissonance as an emotional state, and examined studies defining emotion.
Mehrabian and Russell (1974) analyzed the components of emotion and
presented a reliable scale for measuring emotion using the thre
dimensions of pleasure, arousal and dominance as factors of emotion.
Using this literature Biggers and Christ (1983) formulated the operational definition repeated below:
The state of dissonance can be conceptually defined as an
emotional state composed of low pleasure, high arousal and
at least moderate dominance. Pleasure is low because two
associated elements are inconsistent. The more important
these two elements are to the perceiver the greater the
resulting arousal.
If the two elements are inconsistent
but fairly irrelevant to the perceiver, then we would expect
displeasure but low arousal and, therefore, little pressure
to change. As the elements become more inconsistent, more
displeasure results. The more relevant to the perceiver,
the greater arousal (s)he will feel. Dominance must be
moderately high or change will not occur ••••
If the perceiver does not feel that they have permission to behave
(in this case, change his/her attitude), no change will
occur--no matter how much displeasure or arousal.
Using the excellent foundation laid by Biggers and Christ (1983),
this paper seeks to measure dissonance as defined above and examine
its relationship to attitude change.

Sufficient evidence is given in

current literature to support measurement of dissonance as an emotiona
state both with Mehrabian and Russell's (1974) bipolar adjectives and
thought-listing.

These tools were used in this paper in an attempt

to identify dissonance as a continuous variable which might vary in
intensity.

Research indicates cognitive responses elicited by a

communication are important in determining both the direction and
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degree of attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo,

1979).

Because the

thought-listing procedure does not modify attitude results (Petty &
Cacioppo,

1977), this process will also be used in this paper to as ess

dissonance.

It seems likely that more negative thoughts would resul

from greater dissonance.
Goethals et al. (1979) distinguished between foreseen, foresee bl ,
and unforeseeable consequences.

They defined foreseen consequences

as "those whose possible occurrence the actors are explicitly aware of
at the time of decision."

They referred to foreseeable consequences

as results of behavior not in the actors' awareness at the time of
decision but that they feel they (or any reasonable person) could
have anticipated in light of the information they were explicitly
given.

Unforeseeable consequences were defined as those actors are

not aware of and, furthermore, feel there is no way a reasonable
person could have anticipated the consequences.

They also manipulated

knowledge of consequences (informed or not informed about the consequence).
Students were asked to give a one-minute speech on why their
school should double the size of the freshman class.

Students in the

foreseen conditions were told their speech would be randomly selected
to be heard by one of three groups:

another group of graduate stu-

dents, the school debate team, and the school administration which was
considering increasing the size of the freshman class.

Those in the

foreseeable condition were told their speeches would go to one of three
groups, but they were not told what the groups were.

Subjects in the

unforeseeable conditions continued to believe their speeches were only
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to be used by the experimenter.

After students in each condition gave

their speeches, those in the informed condition were told their speech
was going to the school administration and those in the not informed
conditions were told nothing.
Goethals et al. (1979) used a 2x3 design manipulating knowledge
(informed/not informed) and awareness of consequences (foreseen,
foreseeable, and unforeseeable).

In the informed condition there was

no significant difference in attitude change between foreseen and
foreseeable conditions; however, both levels of the foreseen and foreseeable conditions had significantly greater attitude change (p(.05)
than that in the unforeseeable conditions.
This experiment is a partial replication of the study by Goethals,
Cooper and Naficy (1979).

Because Goethals et al. (1979) found no

significant difference between the foreseen and foreseeable conditions,
this study used a 2x2 design (foreseen/unforeseeable and informed/not
informed).

Based on results of the Goethals et al. study, and the

Biggers and Christ (1983) operational definition of dissonance, the
following hypotheses were postulated:
1.

Subjects in the foreseen-informed and not informed
conditions will experience lower pleasure, higher
arousal and less dominance than subjects in the
unforseeable-informed and not informed conditions.

2.

There will be no significant difference between
levels of pleasure, arousal and dominance experienced
by subjects in the foreseen-informed and not informed
conditions.

3.

There will be no significant difference between
levels of pleasure, arousal and dominance experienced
by subjects in the unforeseeable-informed and not informed conditions.

METHODOLOGY

Subjects
One hundred and thirty students from beginning speech classes at
the University of Central Florida volunteered to participate in thi
experiment.

There were 19 students in a pilot test designed to iden-

tify problems and increase internal validity.

Twenty-six students

served as a control group and completed the attitude scale on a tuition
increase only.

A total of 76 subjects were randomly assigned to the four

experimental conditions.

Eleven of these subjects, across the four

conditions, refused to continue participation upon hearing the experiment involved giving a one-minute speech for a tuition increase at the
University of Central Florida.
Results of the remaining nine participants could not be used for
various reasons.

Five students were on scholarships so the topic

lacked relevance for them, and two advocated a tuition increase from
the beginning.

Partial results for two subjects were not tabulated

because of improperly completed questionnaires.
Variables

Independent Variables
Since Festinger first postulated the Dissonance Theory in 1957,
many researchers have examined the conditions which produce th s psychological and physiological state.

Extensive research indicates dissonance

is produced only when the individual participating in CAA perceives
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unwanted behavioral consequences as a result of their actions (Cooper

& Worchel, 1970; Cooper, Zanna, & Goethals, 1974; Goethals & Cooper,
1972).

Later research indicates that subjects must foresee undesirable

consequences if dissonance is to be generated (Cooper, 1971; Hoyt,
Henley, & Collins,

1972).

The independent variables in this paper were awareness of consequences on two levels (foreseen and unforeseeable) and knowledge of the
actual consequences (informed and uninformed).

Dependent Variables
The dependent variables were attitude change, dissonance (pleasure,
arousal and dominance), and the cognitions (positive and negative) of
the subjects during speech preparation and delivery.
Attitude change was measured on a 19-point scale.

Subjects were

given a statement and asked to check the point on the scale that best
fit attitude:

19 (total agreement) and 1 (total disagreement).

A

comparison was made between the post-treatment attitudes of the experimental conditions to those subjects in the control condition.

No pre-

test was administered.
Measurement of dissonance was examined on two levels: 1) The
emotion measurement scale developed by Mehrabian and Russell (1974)
using pleasure, arousal and dominance (Appendix B); and 2) Cognitions
the subjects had during their five minutes of speech preparation and
their one-minute recorded speech (Petty, Wells & Brock, 1976).

Parti-

cipants in the experiment were asked to take a few minutes to remember
their thoughts and feelings during the six minutes in which they prepared
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and delivered a one-minute speech.

Next, they were asked to write the

thoughts as they occurred in the eight boxes available.

Upon comple-

tion of this assignment subjects were instructed as follows:
There is one more thing I would like you to do. Put a
plus sign (+) next to those thoughts that are positively
related to the speech, preparation and delivery, and put
a negative sign (-) next to those that are negatively
related to the speech, preparation and delivery.

Topic
The topic chosen for this study was tuition increase.

Because

money is a subject dear to the hearts of most students, it was assumed
the majority of individuals participating in this experiment would be
against an escalation in fees.

This assumption was supported by the

mean attitude of the control group toward a tuition increase (mean

=

3.69 on a 19-point scale).

Procedure
Students were told when asked to volunteer for the experiment that
the researcher was a graduate student completing a thesis pertaining to
linguistic devices in oral communication.

When each subject arrived at

the experimental station he/she was given further explanation:
As you were told in class, I am a graduate student in communications working on my thesis on the linguistics devices used
in oral communication. This involves three areas: 1) How arguments are produced;
2) Vocabulary; and 3) Extraneous words
such as "um", "things like that", and "you know." Now I have
chosen a topic I believe most students can relate to, tuition
increase.
I know how most students feel about this (this
gives a chance to see how the subject feels about the issue)
and I have plenty of speeches against a tuition increase. So,
what I am asking you to do is to prepare and give a one minute
speech advocating a tuition increase at UCF. You will have
five minutes to prepare the speech. I need an equal number of
speeches for and against a tuition increase.
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At this point the spiel changed for subjects in each of the four
conditions.
Each subject received treatment individually which took approx imately 20 minutes per subject.

The foreseen consequences condition

consisted of making students aware that two other groups, the school
debate team and the school administration, were interested in l is t e ni ng
to the speech recordings; therefore, their speech would be randoml y
selected to go to one of these groups.

The purpose of other group s

receiving the speeches was explained before subjects agreed to continu e
with the experiment and give the speech. ·
There are two other groups interested in these speeche s : th e
school debate team and the school administration. Your spe e ch
will be randomly selected to go to one of them. The de bat e
team is interested because it is a topic with two sides and
they want to see how students develop arguments and what arg uments they produce in case they someday debate this issue.
The school administration is interested because it is an is s ue
they always face.
They want to see what arguments students
have both for and against a tuition increase, because ther e
are arguments for both sides.
Subjects in the unforeseeable conditions were simply asked to
give a speech for a tuition increase and were given no indication t hat
the speech would be used for any purpose other than that st a t e d in the
introduction.
The informed/not informed variable was manipulated by telling or
not telling subjects the school administration would rec ei v e their
speeches.

Subjects in the foreseen/informed condition wer e informed

after they agreed to continue with the experiment a n d be f ore they gave
the speech.

Subjects in the unforeseeable/informed c ond i t ion were

informed after they had delivered the speech but b efore completing the
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questionnaire.

In the unforeseeable/not informed condition, subjects

simply gave a speech and were never told other groups were interested
in the speeches.
After explaining the experiment to each subject the researcher
made the following statement:
Now that you know what the experiment is about, you are free
to continue or leave ("or go back to class'' if subjects were
participating on class time).
It is up to you.
At this point subjects either continued with five minutes of speech
preparation or left the experimental station.
Each subject received paper and pen to jot down notes compiled in
the five-minute preparation.

The students were free to read from their

notes or give the speech extemporaneously.
recorded on a mini cassette recorder.

Delivery of the speech was

Most students were well prepared

to speak one minute or more while a few found it difficult to speak the
whole minute.
The experimenter returned after five minutes, recorded the speech
and praised the subject for excellent presentation and persuasiveness
of content.

Subjects were then asked to complete the questionnaire.

The questionnaire consisted of thought listing, emotion measurement
scales, a manipulation check scale and an attitude scale.

The mani-

pulation check question was phrased two ways: "I realize that my
speech will be used for groups other than graduate students studying
linguistic devices in oral communication" in 48 questionnaires,
and "I was told that my speech will be used for a group other than
graduate students studying linguistic devices in oral communication"
in 17 questionnaires (see Appendix B).
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This question was phrased two ways because three subjects in the
unforeseeable/not informed condition checked 19 on the 19-interval
scale indicating belief that the speech would be used by another group
even though no mention had been made of other groups' interest.

This

caused concern that subjects interpreted the question as a request for
permission to use the speech for other groups instead of a check on
awareness of other groups' interest.

A one-way analysis of variance

(ANOVA) demonstrated the form of question did not significantly affect
responses to the manipulation check.
Upon completion of the questionnaire, the experimenter asked each
subject to place a plus sign (+) next to thoughts which were favorable
to the speech topic, preparation and delivery, and a negative sign (-)
next to thoughts relating negatively.
neutral rating.

A few subjects gave thoughts a

Judges were not considered necessary to code thoughts

as either positive or negative since research on thought-listing indicates high intercoder reliability between subjects' and judges' ratings
(Janis & Terwillinger,

1962; Cook,

1969; Petty, Wells & Brock,

1976;

Petty & Cacioppo, 1977; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979).
When subjects finished coding thoughts, those in the informed and
foreseen conditions were told that no group other than the researcher
would be listening to the speeches.

The experimenter then explained

briefly the true purpose of the experiment.
One week after completion of data gathering each class received
a letter explaining the purpose of the experiment in greater depth.
This letter is in Appendix C.

RESULTS

The manipulation check indicated that subjects did understand
their speeches would be forwarded to the designated groups.

Table 1

contains the mean responses to the statement "I realize (I was told)
that my speech will be used for a group other than graduate students
studying linguistic devices used in oral communication."

TABLE 1
MEAN AVERAGE OF
KNOWLEDGE OF POSSIBLE SPEECH AUDIENCES

Condition

Foreseen

Unforeseeable

Informed
Not
Informed

Means not sharing a common subscript differ at
the .01% level using Neuman-Keuls.

The means were derived from a 19-interval scale, with l indica ing
belief that the speech would not be used by another group and 19 indieating an understanding that the speech would be used by a designated
group.

Inclusion of the three subjects from the unforeseeable/not

informed condition who checked 19 in the statistical analysis does not
change the result.

The analysis indicates that the appropriate groups

did understand their speeches would be used.
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Emotion Scale
The 9-point emotion scale developed by Mehrabian and Russell
(1974) was assigned the same scale used by those authors:

a scale of

+4 to -4 for each dimension ranging from +4 for extreme happiness to
-4 for extreme unhappiness.

The responses were averaged across the

six items of each emotional factor.

Mehrabian and Russell administered

the scales to subjects in random order; however, this study gave the
scales grouped in the respective emotion category.
The first hypothesis was not supported.

This hypothesis stated

that subjects in the foreseen conditions would experience lower pleasure, higher arousal and less dominance than subjects in the unforeseeable conditions.

Subjects in the unforeseeable/not informed

condition experienced greater pleasure than those in the other three
conditions; however, the difference was not significant.

Arousal

measures indicated little difference between conditions, except
unforeseeable/not informed subject had a lower mean arousal than the
other three conditions.

Both the unforeseeable/not informed and fore-

seen/ informed subjects experienced feelings of greater dominance than
those in the other groups, but not significantly so.
Hypotheses two and three were supported.

No significant differ-

ence resulted between levels of pleasure, arousal and dominance for
the foreseen/informed and not informed conditions.

There was also

no significant difference between levels of pleasure, arousal and
dominance for the unforeseeable/informed and not informed conditions.
Table 2 on the· following page illustrates the mean emotion measures
for each condition.

The F=.659 for pleasure, F=.249 for arousal and
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F=.317 for dominance across all four conditions presents strong support for hypotheses two and three.

TABLE 2
MEAN AVERAGE
EMOTIONAL DIMENSION FOR EACH CONDITION

Emotion

Pleasure

Arousal

Dominance

Foreseen/Informed

1.076

.999

1.208

Foreseen/Not Informed

1.044

1.054

.861

1.060

1. 027

1. 034

• 989

1.156

.918

1. 510

.770

1. 219

1.250

.963

1.068

.659

• 249

• 317

Total Mean for Foreseen

Unforeseeable/Informed
Unforeseeable/Not Informed
Total Mean for Unforeseeable

F Ratios Across All Four
Conditions

It should be noted that if both the foreseen and unforeseeable
conditions are combined, the results for all three emotional dimensions
are in the predicted direction.

Pleasure was less, arousal greater,

and dominance less in the foreseen than in the unforeseeable conditions.

Thought-listing
Subjects in each condition related more positive than negative
thoughts about the topic, speech preparation and delivery.
of positive to negative thoughts is shown in Table 3.

The ratio

A two (positive
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and negative thoughts) by four (conditions) analysis of variance indicated there were significantly more positive than negative thoughts

TABLE 3
TOTAL THOUGHTS AND
RATIO OF POSITIVE TO NEGATIVE THOUGHTS

Thoughts

Positive

Negative

Foreseen/Informed

4.00

2.44

6.44

Foreseen/Not Informed

4.47

1.59

6.06

Unforeseeable/Informed

4.19

1. 56

5.75

Unforeseeable/Not Informed

3.69

2.19

5.88

overall (p(.01).

Total

The ratio of positive to negative thoughts did not

differ across conditions.

Table 4 gives the ratio of positive to

TABLE 4
MEAN POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE THOUGHTS
ABOUT THE ISSUE

Thoughts

Positive

Negative

Total

Foreseen/Informed

2.44

.81

3.25

Foreseen/Not Informed

3.59

.88

4.47

Unforeseeable/Informed

3.44

1.00

4.44

Unforeseeable/Not Informed

1. 25

.50

1.75
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negative thoughts in each condition about the issue.

It seems reason-

able to suggest that the greater the dissonance the higher the ratio
of positive to negative thoughts.

This could be predicted on the

basis that attitude change is a function of the ratio of positive to
negative thoughts generated toward the topic.
the case in the current experiment.

However, this was not

In fact, the ratio of positive to

negative thoughts did not differ across the four conditions.

Attitude Change
Significant attitude change comparable to that of Goethals et al.
(1979) was achieved.
this study.

One difference exists between Goethals et al. and

This study included a control condition in which students

were asked only to state their opinions on a tuition increase at the
University of Central Florida.

Table 5 summarizes the results.

TABLE 5
MEAN ATTITUDE FOR EACH CONDITION INCLUDING CONTROL

Foreseen/
Informed

Foreseen/
Not Informed

Unforeseeable/
Informed

Control

Unforeseeable/
Not Informed

3.69a

Means not sharing a common subscript differ at the 5% level.
6.69 differs from the foreseen conditions at the 10% level.
Higher numbers indicate greater agreement with a tuition
increase (19-interval scale).
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As shown in Table 5, the foreseen conditions produced signif icantly more favorable attitudes toward a tuition increase than the
unforeseeable/informed and control conditions.
to those of Goethals et al. (1979).

The results are similar

In both studies, subjects who

were more aware of negative consequences changed their attitudes to
agree with a tuition increase more than those subjects who were not
aware of negative consequences.

The resulting attitude changes are

in line with the dissonance theory.

However, since the emotion and

thought-listing measures yielded no significant evidence of dissonance,
the data are more amenable to a self-perception theory explanation.

DISCUSSION

The manipulation check results indicate that subjects in the
appropriate conditions were aware that their speeches would be forwarded to one of two other groups.

There was a significant informed

main effect.
Attitude change was in the expected direction.

There was no

significant difference within the two foreseen conditions or within the
two unforeseeable conditions.

Significance resulted at p(.01 for

attitude change between the foreseen groups and the control group.
Results from the foreseen conditions differed from the unforeseeable/
informed condition at the p(.05 and the unforeseeable/not informed
condition at p(.10.

These results are comparable with those of the

Goethals et al. (1979) study.
No significance resulted for any of the three emotion dimensions
across the four conditions.

Findings were in the predicted direction;

however, because significance levels are so small (F(l.O) for all three
dimensions, this must be attributed to chance.

Subjects in the fore-

seen conditions reported slightly less pleasure, more arousal and less
dominance than those in the unforeseeable conditions.
Results from the thought-listing instrument did not support the
theory that dissonance is an uncomfortable emotion.

A two (positive

and negative thoughts) by four (conditions) ANOVA showed that subject s
listed significantly more positive than negative thoughts overall
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(p<.Ol).

Total number of thoughts generated did not differ a c ros s

conditions.
The results of this paper are in the same direction as Geothals
et al. (1979).

Goethals et al. reported significant dif f ere nce s of

p<.OS between the foreseen and foreseeable conditions and the unf ore seeable conditions.

The current study produced a comparable di fference

between the foreseen and unforeseeable/informed condition and a p ( . 10
difference between the foreseen and unforeseeable/not informed co n d i tion.

The unforeseeable/not informed condition is the only one tha t

did not differ significantly from the control group.
Goethals et al. explained their results with dissonance t heo r y ,
but, like others, failed to provide a measure of dissonance.

They

discussed their findings in relation to personal responsibility
and dissonance arousal.

Though Goethals et al. believed the s elf -

justificatory attitude change was present in the foreseen and fo r eseeable conditions due to dissonance, they concluded that dissona nc e
was not present in the unforeseeable conditions.
The findings of this paper do support Goethals et al. conclusion
that no dissonance arousal existed in the unforeseeab l e g r ou ps ; however, there is also no indication of dissonance in the f or eseen groups .
Therefore these data do not support the dissonance the o r y .

Both the

emotion scale and thought-listing results fail to indica t e the presence
of dissonance in subjects during the treatment.
Self-perception theory provides a better fit f or the data .

Bern

(1970, p.15) gives the major hypothesis of sel f -perception as follows:
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In identifying his own internal states, an individual
partially relies on the same external cues that others
use when they infer his internal states.
This theory is in line with dissonance theory in that the theme is
behavior causes change.
variable.

The difference lies in the intervening

Dissonance claims that an unpleasant emotion caused by

inconsistency results in attitude change due to an attempt to justify
actions.

Self-perception states that an individual actually infers

attitudes from his/her behavior and accompanying environmental cues;
there is no inconsistency or unpleasantness.
The many definitions of dissonance attribute emotional characteristics such as guilt, tension, post-decision anxiety and arousal
to this phenomena.

After extensive research, Biggers and Christ

(1983) operationally defined dissonance as an emotion low in pleasure,
high in arousal and slightly higher than midpoint on the dominancesubmissiveness dimension.
Using the emotion scale developed by Mehrabian and Russell (1974),
this paper endeavored to measure dissonance across four conditions.
No significant difference ensued between emotional dimensions of
pleasure, arousal and dominance across the four conditions.
findings were in the predicted direction.

Howe ver,

Subjects in the unf or esee-

able conditions reported more pleasure, less arousal and more dominance
overall.

Arousal is above the midpoint as expected, but the ab ove

midpoint ratings for pleasure and dominance were unexpected f or t he
foreseen groups.
Dominance is an emotional dimension only recently consid e r ed a
component of dissonance by Biggers and Christ (1983).

Because little
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research is available on dominance and dissonance, it is difficult
to present dominance findings.

It is conceivable that subjects saw

themselves as persuaders rather than experimental guinea pigs.

Taking

an unpopular stand (pro-tuition increase) would call for a more persuasive message in order to convince an audience that one is justified
in taking a given position.

The subjects' responsibility for a persua-

sive speech put them in control of their audience to a certain extent.
Knowing they chose to give the speech could also have increased dominant
feelings.
The lack of significant differences in ratings of pleasure across
conditions is puzzling.

Some may argue students did not perceive

negative consequences and that participation was perceived as forced.
However, reactions of the subjects do not support such an explanation.
Subjects reacted negatively to the possibility of others hearing their
speeches.

This is demonstrated by the many negative comments students

made before they agreed to continue participation.

For example, three

students said they were not good at giving speeches and did not want
anyone to hear them, and eight students refused to participate because
they could not think of any reasons to raise the tuition.

Many stu-

dents still agreed to participate even when told others besides the
experimenter were interested in listening to the speeches.
The significance of the manipulation check also supports the perception of negative consequences.

Not only does dissent of 11 students

to continue participation indicate successful manipulation of choice,
but also intimates refusal due to perception of negative consequences.
The relatively high scores reported on the pleasure dimension were
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also supported by the cognitions.

All subjects listed more positive

cognitions than negative cognitions regarding the task.
Overall, the findings conform most closely with self-perception
theory (Bem,

1965).

Where dissonance theory claims it is post-decision

anxiety that causes attitude change, Bem argues subjects infer their
attitudes from overt behavior.

Our results indicate anxiety did not

vary across CAA conditions.
Bern (1972) claims that individuals infer their attitudes from
behavior only when "internal cues are weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable." This statement appears contrary to CAA where the advocate
holds strong internal beliefs (Smith, 1982, p. 135).

Yet, the results

achieved in this paper intimate support for the self-perception theory
even though it is evident that students' did not have weak internal
beliefs regarding a tuition increase initially.

The fact that some

subjects refused to continue participation because they could think of
no arguments advocating a tuition increase and the low mean attitude
score of the control group demonstrate the strong feelings held by
most University of Central Florida students against a tuition increase.
Smith (1982, pp.

135-136) writes that self-perception theory is

too simplistic and that Bern disregards the content of self-generated
messages.
pp.

Smith's thesis disagrees with Himmelfarb and Eagley (1974,

37, 607) who claim Bem seems to be leaning toward an interest in

information processing and a concern with "how information about
self-discrepant behavior is processed in effecting attitude change."
These authors go one step further by asking:
information and react in certain ways?

Why do people process

Some suggested motivations are
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the desire for internal consistency and self-esteem preservation.
Himmelfarb and Eagley (1974, p. 607) note the suggestion by Kelman and
Baron that internal inconsistency triggers an alert that something is
wrong and motivates the person to seek out the problem and solution.
This paper did examine information processing, but it did not
go so far as to study the motivations behind cognitions produced.
Cognitions reported by subjects tend to support the self-perception
theory.

The ratio of positive to negative thoughts is 2:1.

Positive

thoughts were principally those arguments developed by subjects advocating a tuition increase.
to the topic.

Few cognitions indicated conflict relating

Most negative thoughts concerned a dislike for giving

speeches.
Where dissonance explains the inverse relationship between reward
and attitude change with self-justification, self-perception theory
explains it with truth or lie signals.

Bern (1970) supports this

thesis with an illustration from advertising.

He notes that we tend

to believe the person who tells us something without any or little
reward.

For instance, the claims of a housewife interviewed in the

grocery regarding a household cleaning product are more credible than
those made by a movie star.

The audience sees the housewife as being

truthful since she is not receiving a large reward for her statement
yet makes it anyway.

This is not the case with the movie star who

receives a large salary, and probably does very little housework and
grocery shopping.
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Bem believes that individuals infer their attitudes from their
behavior in the same way they inf er the attitudes of others by their
actions and demeanor.
hypothesis.

He conducted an experiment to examine his

Subjects were administered electric shocks, equal in vol-

tage, and told they could terminate the shock anytime they wanted.
Subjects reported the shocks they terminated early as being more
painful.

Bern used this to illustrate his point that individuals

interpret their actions from their behavior.
One postulate regarding the findings of this paper is that
subjects may have surmised their attitudes from their thoughts.
Perhaps students noticed the number of arguments they were able to
produce supporting a tuition increase and re-evaluated their attitudes
accordingly.

They may have concluded that if they could produce

arguments for a tuition increase then they could not have been so
adamantly against an increase in the first place.
arises with this supposition.

However, one issue

Why did some subjects change attitudes

more than others even though the ratio of positive to negative thoughts
was the same across conditions?
and lie signals.

This may be explained with Bern's truth

The thought processes of subjects may have been as

follows:
Foreseen Conditions1.
2.
3.
4.

I agreed to prepare and deliver a pro-tuition speech.
I fulfilled this agreement.
I did so knowing the speech might be given to university
decision makers.
I must, then, believe that a tuition increase is a
reasonable idea (mean= 10.35 is just above midpoint on
the 19-interval scale).
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Unforeseeable/Informed Condition1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

I agreed to do the speech.
I did it.
I was later told it would go to a university group.
It bothers me that my speech will be given to this
group.
I don't feel very good about a tuition increase
(mean= 5.94).

Unforeseeable/Not Informed Condition1.
2.
3.
4.

I agreed to do a speech.
I did it.
It is only being used for an experiment on linguistics.
I don't really believe in a tuition increase
(mean = 6.69).

Though the observations of this paper point toward the self perception theory as a viable explanation, this theory faces bias from
students of attitude change.

The prevailing opinion is that attitude

is an intervening variable intruding between environmental stimulation
and overt responses (Miller, 1973).

Though Bem has research support

for his theory, the obstacle to wide acceptance is the common view
that behavior follows attitude and not vice versa.

Possible Threats to Validity
Threats to internal validity are always present in research.

If

it were not for confounding variables, every researcher's problems
would be solved.

However, this is not the case, and there are several

possible threats to validity in the current study.
First, data collection occurred over a four-day period to give
a wide selection of sign-up times for volunteers.
recruited from eight beginning speech classes.

Volunteers were

Each subject was run in-

dividually by the experimenter and the whole process took approximately
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1/2 hour per treatment.

To prevent leaks from subjects to fellow

classmates over the week, each class was assigned a specific day on
which students from that class could participate.

This procedure

minimized, but did not rule out the possibility of inter-subject
communication.

However, random questionning of subjects indicated

this procedure to be successful overall.

Only one subject, whose

results were not used, admitted he was told by a classmate leaving the
lab exactly what would transpire in the experiment.

A few students

said they asked for details, but subjects who had finished the treatment were very close-mouthed.

It seemed students enjoyed feeling in

"cahoots" with the experimenter by withholding information.
Evaluation apprehension may be cited as a threat to the internal
validity of this study, but freedom of choice to participate should
have alleviated that problem.

In actuality, those students most

afraid of speech delivery did decline to continue participation.
One last area for comment is the selection of subjects.

Because

students volunteered for certain time slots each day, it was impossible
to randomly select subjects from the Speech 1014 pool.

However,

questionnaires were randomly organized, and the available subjects were
randomly assigned to groups.

Random assignment removes selection bias

as a threat to internal validity.

Recommended Changes in Methodology
Two methodological changes are recommended to those who wish to
replicate.

First, future researchers should consider alleviating

anonymity for the speakers.

Goethals et al. ( 1979) recorded the
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name and purpose of the presentation in front of the subject before
the subject actually delivered the speech.

This change would increase

perception of negative consequences, feelings of personal responsibility, and perhaps reduce ratings of pleasure for the task.

It would

also reiterate the condition each subject was in and provide documentation for future examination.
Additionally, replicators of this study should consider administering the questionnaire in two parts.

A two page questionnaire

asking four different things may have overwhelmed subjects.

It was

initially hoped that listing cognitions occuring throughout speech
preparation and delivery would help individuals remember the emotions
experienced during that time also.

This may have been the case, but

since the scales for attitude and perception of negative consequences
were so different from the first two sections, it is recommended that
the last two scales be administered separately.

Areas For Future Research
It is critical that dissonance be measured if it is to remain a
viable explanation of attitude change due to CAA.

If the Mehrabian

and Russell (1974) scale, upon further examination, is considered
inadequate for tapping dissonance, efforts should be made to seek
other measurement tools.

Future researchers of dissonance and self-

perception theories should actively examine the thoughts of subjects
as a means of studying emotions leading to attitude change.

Thought-

listing has become an accepted method for studying information
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processing.

The possibilities for use are numerous.

Thoughts can be

analyzed for quantity and content in a variety of different ways.
Though the attitude change results of this study are commensora te with perception of negative consequences, subjects' cognitions
expressed little concern that the school administration would hear
the speeches.

There could be two reasons for this:

1) students'

names were not recorded before each speech; therefore, they retained
anonymity; and 2) students were only told the school administration
was always faced with the possibility of a tuition increase, but not
that it was an immediate consideration.

In future replication of this

study consideration should be given to increasing the possible negative
consequences resulting from CAA.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this study was to measure dissonance as an emotion
in light of the many definitions posited on the phenomena.

A 2x2 de-

sign was used manipulating knowledge of possible negative consequences
on two levels (foreseen and unforeseeable) and concrete evidence of
negative consequences (informed and not informed).

Sixty-five students

from beginning speech classes at the University of Central Florida
participated in the experiment.

Attitude change results were consis-

tent with those predicted by the dissonance theory and self-perception
theories.

Subjects in the foreseen conditions had significantly

greater attitude change toward the CAA than those in the unforeseeable
conditions.
A scale for measuring emotions, developed by Mehrabian and Russell
(1974), was used to measure dissonance on three dimensions: pleasure,
arousal and dominance.

It was predicted that subjects in the foreseen

conditions would have significantly lower pleasure, greater arousal
and less dominance than those in the unforeseeable conditions.
hypothesis was not supported.

The

Since levels of dissonance were not

obtained, results were explained with the self-perception model.
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APPENDIX A
SIGN-UP SHEET AND CONTROL GROUP ATTITUDE SCALE
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Please sign your name for the time convenient for you.
It should
take 20 minutes at the maximum. Meet in the Journalism Lab, Humanities and Fine Arts Building, fourth floor, room 403. Thank you.
9:00
A.M.
9:20

1:40

6:20

2:00

6:40

9:40

2:20

7:00

10:00

2:40

7:20

10:20

3:00

7:40

10:40

3:20

8:00

11: 00

3:40

8:20

11:20

4:00

8:40

11: 40

4:20

9:00

12: 00
P.M.
12:20

4:40

9:20

5:00

9:40

12:40

5:20

1:00

5:40

1:20

6:00

Date:

There were two places for signatures under each time slot.
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I agree that tuition at the University of Central Florida
should be raised.

No _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ns

APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRES
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QUESTIONNAIRE

We are interested in what you were thinking about during your
speech preparation and delivery. Simply write down the first
idea that comes to mind in the first box, the second idea in
the second box, etc. Please put only one idea or thought in
a box and be specific. You should try to only record those
ideas you were thinking during speech preparation and delivery.
You will have a few minutes to write your thoughts. Please be
completely honest and list all of the thoughts that you had.
Please remember to only list specific thoughts you had during
speech preparation and delivery.

11.
I
I 2.
I
I 3.
I

14.
I
1

I

s.

I 6.
I

17.
I
I 8.
I

PLEASE GO TO NEXT PAGE

50
The following scales provide a range of moods you may have
experienced while making notes for your speech and during
the delivery of your speech. Take about two minutes to
really get into the mood of the situation. Please report
the feelings you had only during your speech preparation and
delivery by responding to the adjective pairs below. Some of
the pairs might seem unusual, but you probably felt more one
way than the other. So, for each pair, put a check mark
(Example: __ :~: __ ) closer to the adjective which you believe describes your feelings better. The more appropriate
that adjective seems, the closer you put your check mark to
it. Please remember only to report the feelings you experience during your speech preparation and delivery.
Happy
Pleased
Satisfied
Contented
Hopeful
Relaxed
Stimulated
Excited
Frenzied
Jittery
Wide Awake
Aroused
Controlling
Influential
In Control
Important
Dominant
Autonomous

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

--..--...--..--...- -..--..--..--..----.--.--.--.--.--.- -.--.---.--.--..--..--..--.--.--.-- -.--.--..--.--.--..--.--.---.- -..- -.--..--..--..·- -.--.--- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

--...--...- - ..--...--..--...- -...--...-- -.--.- -..--.--..--..--.--.---.--.--..--..--..--..--..--..- --..--..--.--..--..--..--..--..---..--..-- .--..-- ..--..--.- -.--- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

--..- -..--..--...--..--...- -...-- ...-- -.--..--.--..- -..--.--.--..-- -..--.--.--.--.--..--.--.---..--..--..--..--..--..--..--.---.--.--..--.--.--.- -..--..--- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -

Unhappy
Annoyed
Unsatisfied
Melancholic
Despairing
Bored
Relaxed
Calm
Sluggish
Dull
Sleepy
Unaroused
Controlled
Influenced
Cared For
Awed
Submissive
Guided

Please check the point on the following scales that best
fits your answer.
1.

I realize that my speech will be used for a group other
than graduate students studying linguistic devices used in
oral communication.
------------· ------ ~s

NO

2.

I agree that tuition at the University of Central Florida
should be raised.
NO--· --------------- ~S
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QUESTIONNAIRE

We are interested in what you were thinking about during your
speech preparation and delivery. Simply write down the first
idea that comes to mind in the first box, the second idea in
the second box, etc. Please put only one idea or thought in
a box and be specific. You should try to only record those
ideas you were thinking during speech preparation and delivery.
You will have a few minutes to write your thoughts. Please be
completely honest and list all of the thoughts that you had.
Please remember to only list specific thoughts you had during
speech preparation and delivery.

I 1.
I
I 2.
I
I 3.
I

14.
I

Is.
I
I 6.
I

17.
I

18.
I

PLEASE GO TO NEXT PAGE
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The following scales provide a range of moods you may have
experienced while making notes for your speech and during
the delivery of your speech. Take about two minutes to
really get into the mood of the situation. Please report
the feelings you had only during your speech preparation and
delivery by responding to the adjective pairs below. Some of
the pairs might seem unusual, but you probably felt more one
way than the other. So, for each pair, put a check mark
(Example: __ :__!._: __ ) closer to the adjective which you believe describes your feelings better. The more appropriate
that adjective seems, the closer you put your check mark to
it. Please remember only to report the feelings you experience during your speech preparation and delivery.
Happy
Pleased
Satisfied
Contented
Hopeful
Relaxed
Stimulated
Excited
Frenzied
Jittery
Wide Awake
Aroused
Controlling
Influential
In Control
Important
Dominant
Autonomous

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

- -..- -..--...--..--..--...--...--...- --.--.--.--.--..- -..--.--..---..-- .--..--..--..--..--.--..-- -.--..--..--.--..--..--..--..---.- -.- -.--.- -.--.--.--.--- -- - - --.--.--.- -.-- --

--..- -...- -..--...--..-- ...--...--...---..- -.--.--.--.--..--..--..---..--..--..--.-- ..--.--.--..--- --.--..--.--..--.--.--..---: -- : - -:--: --: -- : --: -- : --- -- -- -- - - -- -- -- --

. . . . . . . .
- -.--..--.--..--.--.--.--..---.--.- -.-- .- -.--.-- .--.-- -..--.--.- -.--.--..--.--..---..--.--..--..--.--.--.--..--- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -..--..- -...--..--..--...--..- -..--

Unhappy
Annoyed
Unsatisfied
Melancho lie
Despairing
Bored
Relaxed
Calm
Sluggish
Dull
Sleepy
Unaroused
Controlled
Influenced
Cared For
Awed
Submissive
Guided

Please check the point on the following scales that best
fits your answer.
1.

I was told that my speech will be used for a group other
than graduate students studying linguistic devices used in
oral communication.

NO
2.

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

YES

I agree that tuition at the University of Central Florida
should be raised.

-----------------IBS
NO

APPENDIX C
DEBRIEFING LETTER
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The Thesis Title is "A Method for Evaluating Dissonance a an Emotion
leading to Attitude Change."
A short definition of dissonance is:
The feeling a person experiences when he/she participates in
behavior contrary to their beliefs.
There have been over 900 studies done on this phenomena. Most research
shows that persons who participate in activity counter to their attitudes (counterattitudinal advocacy-CAA), they usually change their
attitude to match their behavior.
Some researchers credit this attitude change to dissonance. They
believe that the conflict people feel when they act contradictory to
their beliefs, the uncomfortable conflict causes them to change.
Research indicates that attitude change may result from this feeling,
but no one has explicitly sought to investigate dissonance as an emotion itself. There are two reasons for this:
1) Emotions are very
hard to define; and 2) Emotions are difficult to measure. This presents
a difficulty in dissonance research, however. Because dissonance has
never been "proven" so to speak, dissonance researchers are always
facing scholars who do not credit their explanations for attitude
change.
The purpose of my paper is to define dissonance operationally and then
measure it. Mehrabian and Russell, in 1974, developed a 81% reliable
tool for measuring emotions. This was the scale on the second page of
the questionnaire.
I hoped that by asking students to give speeches advocating a tuition
increase (the majority of students are against this) they would experience dissonance and attitude change. At this point, I do not have my
results computed, but when they are, they will be available in the
library in my thesis.
Thank you so much for your cooperation. It was greatly appreciated.
If any of you seek a masters and are required to do a thesis, just
give me a holler.
Don't feel bad ••• I have begun to think that a tuition increase isn't a
bad idea after all.
Signature
P.S.

Your speeches are not going to be listened to by anyone.
was just a manipulation to increase dissonance.

That
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